From The Economist Blog:
If we cannot discount the interests of the fetus simply because it is not yet with us as a person, then how can one morally justify legal abortion as a coherent national policy? In the United States, at least, the argument generally centres around whether or not the fetus is a "person"—an argument which only makes sense, given the time horizon, with a very aggressive use of time preference.
Contrasting this to concern about global warming, she writes:
Then I began exploring the permutations that might logically reconcile favouring legal abortion, on the one hand, and perfect concern for the welfare of unnamed descendants 2,000 years hence. Is it that the unnamed descendants are not yet fetuses? Does non-fetushood convey protections? But surely, barring scientific advance, they will eventually be fetuses, before they are people.
There are, of course, other arguments in favour of legalised abortion. One could say, for example, that women have no obligation to support a fetus just because it happens to be helplessly dependant—but this would seem to undercut any moral support for the social safety net and the income tax.
I find it hard to construct a really compelling argument in favour of abortion which does not rest in some way on discounting the utility of the fetus-as-future-person. Though I have not myself been pregnant, I observe that my friends and relatives appear to prefer the horrors of pregnancy to not being alive. Thus, comparing straight utility, the fetus should win in a cost-benefit analysis.
Read the whole thing!
Tyler Cowen comments:
This is a real ouch, her barbs are directed at left-liberals but they do not stop there. In my view we should subsidize births, keeping in mind that the long-run is the relevant time horizon. I also believe a free and wealthy society will, at some point, have many more people than the alternatives, and on an ongoing basis. As for what kind of restrictions on abortion are a good way to subsidize births, that is a very tricky question, especially keeping in mind I am not a pure utilitarian but rather a pluralist...
I think the author (Megan?) makes some excellent points. I have always found arguments for abortion to spare the baby from growing up as an unwanted child incredibly weak on both moral and utilitarian grounds. Growing up unwanted is tragic, but it's a far better option than not growing up at all. Likewise for population control. If population growth truly is a problem, wouldn't suicide be a far more noble solution? I am by no means advocating this position, but you get the point.
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